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Abstract 
The paper analyzes the development of economic 
theory in a crisis period. Emphasis is placed on  
two crises: the Great Depression and the Global 
Economic Crisis. The paper aims to test the as-
sumption of the circularity of economic theories 
through an analysis of the global crises as periods 
of transformation within the overall economic 
environment. The paper describes in some detail  
the Keynesian model originating after the period 
of the Great Depression. The second part of the 
paper explains the trends in the development of 
economic theory between the two crisis periods, 
as well as the theoretical context in which the 
Global Economic Crisis started. The research 
shows that during periods of global economic 
fluctuations and disturbances the leading theoret-
ical framework for economic policy and changes 
in the economic paradigm are questioned. Inade-
quate government intervention in the period of 
the Great Depression, especially in the United 
States, was an important lesson for economic 
policy makers during the Global Crisis. In the 
world's economies affected by the crisis, anti-
cyclical monetary and fiscal policies of the 
Keynesian type were implemented. After years of 
domination by the new liberal ideology in eco-
nomic policy, there has been a sudden reaffirma-




U radu se analizira razvoj ekonomskih teorija u 
periodu krize. Akcenat je stavljen na dvije krize: 
veliku depresiju i savremenu globalnu 
ekonomsku krizu. Cilj rada je da se, analizom 
globalnih kriza, kao perioda transformacije 
ukupnog privrednog ambijenta, testira pret-
postavka o cirkularnosti ekonomskih teorija. U 
radu je detaljnije objašnjen model kejznijanske 
doktrine koji je nastao nakon perioda velike 
depresije. U drugom dijelu su objašnjeni trendovi 
razvoja ekonomske teorije između dva krizna 
perioda, kao i teorijski kontekst u kojem se razvi-
jala savremena globalna ekonomska kriza.  
Istraživanjem je utvrđeno da u periodima global-
nih ekonomskih fluktuacija i poremećaja dolazi 
do preispitivanja vodećeg teorijskog okvira u 
ekonomskoj politici i promjene ekonomske para-
digme. Neadekvatna državna intervencija u peri-
odu velike depresije, posebno u SAD, bila je 
važna pouka za nosioce ekonomskih politika u 
savremenoj krizi. U svjetskim privredama koje su 
pogođene krizom, sporovedene su anticiklične 
mjere monetarne i fiskalne politike kejnzijanskog 
tipa. Nakon dugogodišnje dominacije nove liber-
alne doktrine u ekonomskoj politici, došlo je do 
nagle reafirmacije kejnzijanske koncepcije.  
 
Introduction 
Economic crises are the biggest threat to stable 
economic growth and development. They are 
an integral part of the economic cycle, which is 
unpredictable, asymmetric and irregular. In an 
environment of constant change, companies 
make decisions, set up expectations and plan 
from a long-term perspective. The moment a 
crisis hits, everyone is put to a test. It is a 
fundamental challenge of survival. The market 
becomes a stage for very complex 
interdependent relationships between 
households, businesses and governments.  
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Every decision made increases in importance, 
responsibility and character. And each and 
every one of them tries to answer the essential 
question: How can we survive the crisis? 
Recommendations are offered by economic 
theory. The crisis is a stumbling block for the 
adopted intellectual framework, but also a 
chance for the (r)evolution of new concepts 
and ideas. While in practice it seems 
devastating and with real consequences, in 
theory the crisis serves as inspiration and a 
valuable experiment against which to test the 
validity of economic analysis and research. 
This is confirmed by a very prolific period for 
the development of economic theory after the 
Great Depression of the 1930s. Economic 
science  experienced huge progress during the 
crisis time. Macroeconomics was born. The 
Great Depression of the 1930s stands as a re-
markable example of creative destruction in 
economic theory. The neoclassical doctrine em-
bodied in the then current philosophy of lais-
sez faire dictated the pace and intensity of eco-
nomic policy on the eve of and during the 
Great Depression. The supporters of the neo-
classical theory suggested that the US govern-
ment should not intervene until every fourth 
worker had lost their job. Such advice on a 
passive economic policy was the result of the 
belief that the market was a self-regulating 
mechanism. However, as time went on and 
the crisis developed the contours of a major 
depression, doubts arose about the liberal 
concept of voluntary unemployment and Say’s 
Law. 
 
This excessive faith in the power of the market 
rendered the state interventionism of the early 
1930s inadequate. The choice of passive mone-
tary and fiscal policies was inappropriate. 
Before the crisis, the FED had created a pro-
cyclical policy and allowed the growth of the 
money supply by 61% over 8 years. The in-
crease in interest rates came late and did not 
affect the speculators, but rather investors in 
the property sector. When the crisis hit, the 
policy of low interest rates did not yield re-
sults because deflation was significant and 
chronic. Open market operations were not 
implemented widely until 1932, which was too 
late and insufficient to solve the serious prob-
lem of the banking crises. The belief in the real 
bills doctrine was a stumbling block for the 
monetary policy. /1/ The FED allowed over 
9,000 banks to declare bankruptcy. On the 
other hand, the fiscal policy was burdened by 
the political motive of balancing the budget. 
The insufficient growth in public consumption 
and investment, as well as an overly optimistic 
reliance on the agreement to freeze wages and 
social responsibility in the private sector, con-
tributed to a rapid increase in unemployment 
and a decline in production. The Global Eco-
nomic Crisis which began at the end of the past 
decade created new fields of action for seem-
ingly forgotten economic theories. Thus, in 
recent times in many economies the question 
is raised: Is Keynes "dead"? Is the hypothesis 
of the self-regulation of the market confirmed? 
Is state interventionism still undesirable, or 
has it become a necessity  because of the 
greedy gamblers in the financial markets that 
have long marginalized the role of the state in 
economic life? Two of the greatest global eco-
nomic crises in modern history – the Great 
Depression (1929) and the Global Economic Crisis 
(2008) – represent experiments of a sort for 
economic theory, analysis and policy. There-
fore, the rest of the paper will focus on the 
development and the circularity of economic 
theories in the two crisis periods. We will first 
discuss the creation of macroeconomic theo-
ries after the Great Depression with an em-
phasis on the fundamental disputes and points 
of contact between the theoretical extremes. 
After that, the macroeconomic debate will be 
placed in the context of today's global econom-
ic crisis, in order to examine the validity of the 




1. Crisis as an inspiration for the develop-
ment of economic theory - the case of the 
Great Depression 
 
The emergence of a new economic school – 
Keynesianism - created a rather complex eco-
nomic environment at the beginning of the 
fourth decade of the twentieth century. The 
capitalist world entered an until then unprec-
edented economic depression. If the data on 
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the growth of the nominal GDP and the un-
employment rate in the United States,  then 
the world's leading economy, are taken as a 
valid sample and analyzed, it becomes clear 
that the crisis seriously shook the non-
interventionist concept of laissez faire. The rate 
of economic growth, after a period of rapid 
expansion, reached almost -25% in 1932. Only 
a year later, the unemployment rate reached a 
peak of 25%. 
 




  Reference: Gordon, R. J., Macroeconomics, 10th edition, Pearson, Boston, 2006, p. 600.  
 
The globalization of the economic disturb-
ances generated in the US economy, and even 
the political events in the years between the 
two World Wars accelerated the development 
of economic ideas in order to offer coherent 
answers and solutions to the emerging eco-
nomic problems. The English economist John 
Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) is credited with 
the development in economic thought in this 
period. Even before the Great Depression and 
prior to writing The General Theory of Employ-
ment, Interest and Money, Keynes criticized the 
laissez faire concept and the principles of 
(neo)classical economics. In The End of Laissez-
faire (1926) he advocated for the state regula-
tion of economic processes and a change to the 
existing classical paradigm./2/ Keynes notes 
that experience and practice show that public 
and private interests will not always coincide. 
The assertion that self-interest is always en-
lightened is incorrect. There is no invisible 
hand that would manage to tempt personal 
interest to achieve the social optimum. Keynes 
said that it was precisely the Great Depression 
that served as evidence of the groundlessness 
of the neoclassical concept of voluntary unem-
ployment. He writes: " It is not very plausible to 
assert that unemployment in the United States 
in 1932 was due either to labour obstinately 
refusing to accept a reduction of money-wages 
or to its obstinately demanding a real wage 
beyond what the productivity of the economic 
machine was capable of furnishing" /3/ This 
unemployment rate, according to Keynes, can 
only be explained by involuntary unemploy-
ment, as a permanent feature of the capitalist 
system. Therefore, an active economic policy 
of the state is needed in the pursuit of full 
employment. Contrary to the tenets of classical 
economics, according to which supply creates 
its own demand, Keynes lays the foundation 
of a different concept – effective demand is the 
factor which determines the size of the supply. 
Two determinants have a dominant influence 
on effective demand: consumption and invest-
ment. Defining the model (see Figure 1) of de-
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pendent and independent variables, and a 
number of determinants which condition 
changes to them, Keynes makes specific rec-
ommendations on how to reduce unemploy-
ment and eventually achieve  full employ-
ment. Unemployment was the biggest eco-
nomic problem that made the world economy 
in the 1930s unstable. Its consequence was 
deflation, the nightmare faced by entrepre-
neurs, primarily due to wage costs which are 
directly related to sales revenue. It was pre-
cisely their fear of losses that caused the re-
duction in production and subsequent decline 
in employment. In such a situation, when 
household consumption and private invest-
ment, as the main factors of effective demand, 
are not sufficient to achieve full employment, 
the government can and must increase em-
ployment by an expansion of public spending. 
It is necessary to use the instruments of eco-
nomic policy that would, through the invest-
ment multiplier effect, stimulate economic 
activity, eliminate deflationary expectations 
and reduce uncertainty. 
In this sense, monetary and credit policy must 
be expansive. The most important instrument 
of monetary-credit policy, according to 
Keynesians, is the interest rate. It must be kept 
at a low level in order to encourage invest-
ment. On the other hand, an expansionary 
fiscal policy, in addition to reducing taxes, 
involves the launching of public investment 
and public works, with the aim of increasing 
employment and national income. A frequent 
question on public investment may be formu-
lated as follows: “What will you do, when you 
have built all the houses and roads and town 
halls and electric grids and water supplies and 
so forth which the stationary population of the 
future can be expected to require?”./4/ Re-
sponding to this, Keynes said that the same 
question could be asked about private invest-
ment and the expansion of industry because it 
is easier to imagine the saturation of demand 
for new factories and plants than it is for pub-
lic goods. Therefore, the state must exert its 
influence, which does not exclude a series of 
compromises and cooperation with the private 
sector. Nevertheless, taking ownership over 
the means of production is not the crucial 
thing that the state must do. Keynes writes: “It 
is certain that the world will not much longer 
tolerate the unemployment which, apart from 
brief intervals of excitement, is associated — 
and, in my opinion, inevitably associated — 
with present-day capitalistic individual-
ism.”/5/ In this sense, Keynesian critique of 
classical theory is also focused on logical er-
rors and the oversight associsated with certain 
assumptions, which together resulted in it  not 
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Source: Snowdon, B.; Vane, H. R., Modern Macroeconomics, Edward Elgar, London, 2005, p. 64. 
 
Therefore, the Keynesian explanation of the 
Great Depression suggests a model for state 
intervention. The central position in the model 
is taken by  the concept of aggregate demand 
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management. It is important both in the 
period of depression, when the aggregate 
demand is too low, and in a period of 
expansion, when excessive aggregate demand 
exerts pressure on inflation. In the first phase, 
it is necessary to stimulate demand by 
expansionary policies, while in the second 
phase, it is necessary to "discipline" it through 
restrictive policies. Given that the market is 
not a perfect mechanism of self-regulation, it is 
the responsibility of government to use its 
power in the field of anti-cyclical economic 
policies so as to improve the macroeconomic 
performance of the economy. The shortest 
path to this goal in the period of crisis is to 
increase aggregate demand. Due to market 
imperfections in the stage of adaptation, state 
interventionism is unavoidable. It seems that 
in his argument Keynes tried to point out a 
“third  way” , criticizing both liberal conserva-
tism and socialism. The system of laissez faire 
ensures economic freedoms, but what are eco-
nomic freedoms without prosperity, resources 
and income? Central planning and socialism 
guarantee full employment and secure in-
come, but what is full employment without 
individual freedoms?  Keynes's concept en-
compassed a new dimension, that of full em-
ployment and  individual freedoms existing 
simultaneously /6/. The very idea of a third 
way,  free from  theoretical extremes, 
embodied in the Keynesian concept, 
underwent a revolution in economic theory in 
the first half of the last century. The new ideas 
were getting more and more followers, and 
after World War II the theory of Keynesian 
interventionism entered the political practice 
of Anglo-Saxon capitalism. Thus, the first 
sentence of  The White Paper of Employment 
Policy (1944) in Great Britain  states the 
following: “Government accept[s] as one of 
their primary aims and responsibilities the 
maintenance of a high and stable level of em-
ployment after the war. ”/7/ Two years later, 
the US Employment Act stresses the 
responsibility of the Federal Government to 
“to promote maximum employment, produc-
tion, and purchasing power.” /8/ 
Creating an anti-cyclical economic policy and 
a broader (macroeconomic) view of the eco-
nomic life of capitalist economies is the result 
of innovations in economic theory during the 
Great Depression. The depression was a fun-
damental change in the socio-economic con-
text, which called for new and different solu-
tions. The change in the current economic 
paradigm highlighted the growing importance 
of discretion in relation to fixed rules in eco-
nomic policy, which ultimately meant the 
affirmation of Keynesian interventionism ver-
sus the liberal idea of  non- interventionism 
and a passive economic policy. 
2. Economic theory and the contemporary 
global economic crisis 
The global economic crisis represents the 
greatest challenge for modern economic poli-
cy. The sophisticated and complex financial 
infrastructure in the United States, which was 
inaugurated as a strategic factor for economic 
growth, became the weakest link in the system 
during the crisis. Many macroeconomists have 
questioned the justification of any further af-
firmation of such an economic model. Should 
it be changed and to what extent? What does 
economic theory say? Is the crisis of the global 
capitalist economy at the same time  a crisis of 
economic theory? These dilemmas are the 
subject of contemporary intellectual debate. 
2.1. The causes of the global economic 
crisis - the neoliberal context 
The global economic crisis came about as a 
result of interconnected adverse economic 
circumstances. To understand the theoretical 
and economic context in which it developed, 
one should at least for a  moment pay 
attention to the period of transformation in 
leading economic theory in the economic 
policies of the traditional capitalist economies. 
In fact, after 1973, serious economic problems 
arose, which marked the end of the Keynesian 
golden age. As illustrated in Diagram 2, the 
new economic contraction was accompanied 
by rising unemployment and an above-
average inflation rate. The unemployment rate 
in 1982 in the UK reached 11.1% and in the 
United States 9.7%. Already in 1974, all G7 
countries, except Germany, recorded double-
digit inflation rates. Of course, the inflation 
growth occured because of the oil crisis, that is 
the oil supply decrease on the world market 
(the OPEC cartel - Organization of Petroleum 
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Exporting Countries - operation). Within a 
very short period in the fall of 1973, the price 
of crude oil quadrupled. The second oil shock 
occurred in 1979, which is indicated by a 
dramatic increase in the inflation rate as  
shown in the diagram. 
 
Diagram 2: Inflation and unemployment in the G7 economies (1973–1983) 
 
Source: OECD, http://stats.oecd.org/ (pristup – 30. 11. 2013) (inflation); Gordon, R. J., Macroeconomics, op. cit., p. 
601–607 (unemployment). 
The economic problems inherent in the 
capitalist system in the 1970s could not be 
solved within the prevailing Keynesian model. 
The problem was that Keynesian theory, or the 
original Phillips curve as its basic analytical 
instrument, did not provide for the possibility 
of stagflation, the simultaneous increase in 
unemployment and inflation with stagnant 
production. The powerlessness of the 
Keynesian theory and the pursuit of the 
reaffirmation of neoclassical ideas led to the 
abandoning of the Keynesian approach in the 
economic policies of the leading capitalist 
economies in the late 1970s. 
The new classical doctrines (monetarism, 
rational expectations theory and the 
economics of supply), shared, among others, 
an important factor of cohesion – the 
promotion of market mechanisms with a 
commitment to civil non-interventionism. The 
theory of efficient financial markets and the 
new classical macro-concept replaced the 
Keynesian vision of economic policy. The 
existing system of strong financial regulation, 
developed after the period of Great 
Depression, was reconstructed in the process 
of radical deregulation, which opened the space 
for the transition into a globally integrated 
neoliberal capitalism. 
The new financial architecture meant a rapid 
development in financial innovation, which, 
thanks to the newly established practice of 
securitization, became both increasingly com-
plex and opaque, and thus in a period of crisis, 
making it both dangerous and lacking in li-
quidity. On the other hand, the system was 
based on light touch regulation of commercial 
banks, even more lenient regulation of 
investment banks and a very limited, almost 
non-existent regulation of the shadow banking 
system./9/ With a view to further deregulating 
the financial system in the late 1990s, the strict 
regulations implemented by adopting the 
Glass-Steagal Act  of 1933 were formally 
repealed. By the adoption of the Financial 
Services Modernization Act of 1999 the barri-
ers between commercial banking and opera-
tions with securities were eliminated. The 
provisions of  the Glass-Steagal Act, which 
forbid the use of deposits for the purpose of 
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trading securities become redundant. This 
made it possible to create a very intricate sys-
tem of relations between entities in the finan-
cial market. The extent of this interdependence 
and the activity of the entities were beyond the 
reach of the state control. The assumption of 
self-regulation of the market was revived. 
2.2. Overcoming the crisis - Keynesian 
solutions 
 
The first half of the twentieth century brought 
a deep economic crisis to the capitalist world. 
The reaction of the state, primarily in the Unit-
ed States, was not adequate. The undecided 
and not credible measures of the monetary 
and fiscal authorities contributed to the devel-
opment of economic depression. The moment 
when it became apparent that the market 
failed to solve the problem, the conditions 
were created for the development of measures 
of state interventionism. The Roosevelt admin-
istration operated through instinct and im-
provisation, with more and more frequent 
instructions from the concept that would later 
be named Keynesianism. 
Unlike Roosevelt, the leaders of the world's 
economies in the global economic crisis had at 
their disposal sophisticated mechanisms of 
action and intervention. Certain differences in 
the way the instruments of fiscal and mone-
tary policy were used were certainly present, 
but their character was undoubtedly Keynes-
ian and anti-cyclical. 
The modern anti-crisis policy in the major 
economies was carefully coordinated and syn-
chronized. The G20 political forum was in 
charge of the coordination of anti-crisis poli-
cies. At the first G20 summit in Washington in 
November 2008,  a coordinated implementa-
tion of expansionary fiscal policy measures (to 
stimulate domestic demand) and an expan-
sionary monetary policy (in order to stabilize 
the financial system and ensure the necessary 
liquidity) was agreed. All the major interna-
tional financial institutions (the IMF, the 
World Bank and other multilateral develop-
ment banks) were recognized as key mecha-
nisms of global interventionism, which re-
quired financial support from the G20 coun-
tries. An important conclusion of the first 
summit was the agreement that no country  
should use any kind of protectionist measures 
over the next 12 months. This certainly points 
to the fact that one of the key lessons of the 
Great Depression was learned – national 
economies do not benefit from increasing tar-
iffs during a global crisis and it can only result 
in a decline in world trade. 
After the global intervention, the next level 
was national. The analysis of the anti-crisis 
policy measures of the US, the EU, China, 
Japan and other developed economic centers 
leads to the conclusion that the period of glob-
al economic crisis saw a reaffirmation of 
Keynesian economics. 
 Monetary policy 
 
When it comes to monetary policy, all the 
Central Banks acted quickly and anti-
cyclically. This is best illustrated by the rapid 
decrease in the Federal funds rate and the 
discount rate in the United States (Diagram 3). 
After a series of reductions, the FED reduced 
the target rates of  federal funds to 3% by 
February 2008. By May, the rate was 2%, and 
in December 2008 it reached a record low of 
0−0.25%.  This record low value remained so 
for a long time, while the discount rate, after 
the period of crisis, frequently deviates from 
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Diagram 3: Federal funds rate (blue) and the Discount rate (Red) of the FED 
 
Source: Federal Reserve System, www.federalreserve.gov (Access – 01. 08. 2013). 
In the EU, China and Japan a similar policy 
was effected to that in the US, and the alarm 
for the intervention of the Central Banks was 
the bankruptcy of the US financial giant – 
Lehman Brothers – in September 2008. The 
European Central Bank responded by 
reducing key interest rates in order to preempt 
the problem of the insolvency of financial 
institutions. In January 2009, after four 
sessions of reduction, the key interest rates 
had the same value as in June 2003. 
 
By the end of 2008, the Central Bank of China 
reduced its one-year interest rates on loans to 
financial institutions from 4.68% to 3.33% and 
the discount rate from 4.32% to 1.80%. The rate 
on required reserves was also reduced from 
1.89% to 1.62% and the rate on the excess 
reserves of depository institutions from 0.99% 
to 0.72%. In late December 2008, the 
mandatory level of required reserves was 
reduced once again./10/  
 
As in other developed economies, the Central 
Bank of Japan decided to rapidly reduce its 
interest rates. Thus, the targeted overnight rates 
decreased from 0.5% to 0.3% at the end of 
October 2008, and to 0.1% two months later. 
At the same time, the basic interest rate for loans 
was reduced from 0.5% to 0.3%. 
 
These conventional monetary policy measures, 
which entailed a reduction of the key interest 
rates, were not sufficient to provide the 
necessary liquidity within the financial 
system. That is why all the Central Banks in 
the observed economies started implementing 
unconventional monetary policy measures. In 
the case of the US, the FED effected the 
policies of quantitative and qualitative easing. 
The former meant increasing the assets of the 
Central Bank, and the later changing its 
composition in favor of risky securities. Thus, 
the total value of the FED's assets increased 
from 894 billion dollars at the end of 2007 to 
2,237 billion in december 2009./11/ 
 
The monetary authorities in Europe did not 
implement such aggressive policies. The Bank 
of England opted for the policy of quantitative 
easing, while the ECB also chose quantitative 
easing. At the end of 2008, the Bank of Japan 
launched a credit easing policy. As the interest 
rate on overnight loans without collateral was 
already at the level of 0.1%, its further 
reduction was almost impossible. Thus, the 
bank decided to fully expand and increase its 
purchases of government bonds. In addition, 
the number of securities that the Central Bank 
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 Fiscal policy 
 
The global economic crisis confirmed the 
relative weakness of anti-crisis monetary 
policy. In fact, the crisis demanded a very 
strong and comprehensive response from 
fiscal policy makers. This is entirely consistent 
with Keynesian theory, which emphasizes the 
primacy of fiscal over monetary policy. 
 
As early as the end of 2008, many world 
economies began to implement huge fiscal 
stimuli that were intended to increase 
employment, disposable income and 
aggregate demand. The similarity in the 
implementation of fiscal policy was apparent. 
Of course, this was entirely dependent on the 
current fiscal position. Those economies that 
had effected a more responsible budgetary 
policy before the crisis (including low public 
debt and budget deficit) had more space to 
create aggressive expansionary measures. This 
is confirmed by the following diagram 
illustrating the share of fiscal stimuli as a 
percentage of GDP in the Eurozone countries. 
 
 
Diagram 4: The extent of fiscal stimulus in the Eurozone (% of GDP) 
 
 
Source: European Central Bank, Euro Area Fiscal Policies and the Crisis, ECB, Occasional Paper Series, No. 109, 
Frankfurt, 2010, p. 25. 
 
The fiscal stimulus in the Eurozone was 
implemented within four general categories: 
public investment, support to households, the 
economy and the labor market. Half of the 
stimulus was intended for households 
through the implementation of various 
programs and measures such as the reduction 
of direct taxes, the value added tax (VAT) and 
social security contributions and the financial 
support to socially vulnerable groups. 
Approximately 28% of the total fiscal package 
in the Eurozone was allocated for public 
investment, especially in “green” industries 
and energy efficiency projects. More than half 
of the countries  implemented significant 
measures to support business, such as 
reducing tax rates and social security 
contributions, as well as accelerating the 
process of refunding VAT. The remaining 5% 
of the stimulus was targeted towards an active 
labor market policy, which was initially 
supported by only a few governments of the 
Eurozone. The US Treasury implemented 
three fiscal stimuli totaling $ 1655 billion. The 
strongest expansionary fiscal measures were 
effected through the application of the third 
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stimulus (the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act – ARRA) adopted in 
February 2009. Of the total of nearly $ 800 
billion, 290.7 billion was allocated for tax 
relief, 255.6 billion for education, 
infrastructure projects and transport and 251.3 
billion for health care, unemployment 
insurance and so on. China also implemented 
a comprehensive fiscal stimulus. On 5 
November 2008, Chinese authorities adopted 
the initial stimulus amounting to 4 trillion 
yuan (586.68 billion US dollars), ie. 12.5% of 
the national GDP. If we analyze the structure 
of the expansionary fiscal policy, it becomes 
immediately clear that public works were the 
most important element of China's stimulus. 
/13/ In 2009 almost every sector of the 
economy ( industry, agricultural production, 
trade, the automotive industry and others) 
was allocated  from 10% to 40% more than in 
the previous year. 
The analysis of the anti-crisis policy of the 
world's most important economies during this 
crisis points to the fact that the Anglo-Saxon 
model of neoliberal capitalism was considera-
bly shaken. The crisis saw a sudden reaffirma-
tion of Keynesian theory and anti-cyclical eco-
nomic policy. The reaction of the monetary 
and fiscal policy makers shows that discretion 
had an advantage over fixed rules. Additional-
ly, while it was clear that the Central Banks 
did not have a strong enough capacity to miti-
gate the negative trends,  it was necessary that 
the fiscal authorities took on a prime role in 
formulating  economic policy. 
2.3 The new economic model - back to the 
old ways. 
When analyzing the different interpretations 
of the global economic crisis, it becomes clear 
that systematic differences among economic 
theorists and macroeconomists still exist. A 
crisis, therefore, is not a good time for consen-
sus. The gap between theories deepens, and 
everybody looks for errors in someone else's 
backyard. Within the new socio-economic 
realities each doctrine tries to  find some space 
for itself  to justify its own principles. While 
some seek the problem in the state, others are 
looking for it in the market. Additionally, po-
tential solutions and recommendations vary 
greatly. Those advocating liberal ideas still 
believe in the power of the market, while oth-
ers request effective intervention on the part of 
the state administration. It seems that almost 
no one had such an important role in the 
various explications of the global economic 
crisis as Alan Greenspan, Chair of the US 
Federal Reserve from 1987 to 2006. Critics of 
the long-term management of the American 
Central Bank were satisfied with Greenspan's 
statement before Congress in October 2008 
when he admitted an “error in the model” the 
financial system was based on. “I made a mis-
take in presuming that the self-interests of 
organisations, specifically banks and others, 
were such that they were best capable of pro-
tecting their own shareholders and their equi-
ty in the firms," /14/, said Greenspan. 
Greenspan's successor Ben Bernanke  thinks 
that the FED played a key role in securing the 
necessary liquidity in order to stop panic in 
the financial markets. However, he points out 
that the crisis has left its mark on the 
reputation of economics as a science, and 
above all, economic engineering and 
management. With this in mind, it is not 
necessary to fundamentally rethink economics  
or finance. The crisis should direct research 
focus towards financial instability and its 
implications for the real economy. The 
standard macroeconomic models did not 
predict the crisis, because they were created 
for a different economic context, says 
Bernanke./15/ 
On the other hand, two authors of a Keynesian 
orientation, Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz, 
criticized the pre-crisis model and gave 
suggestions for creating a new paradigm. 
Krugman attributed the general failure of 
economists to explain the pre-crisis period to a 
blind belief in the  efficient market theory and 
the theory of real business cycles. Some 
economists' comments suggest that they were 
ignoring almost 80 years of macroeconomic 
analysis, as well as the Keynesian model of 
aggregate demand and multipliers. Krugman 
concludes that we have entered  a dark age of 
macroeconomics, in which a large proportion 
of the profession have lost all the previously 
acquired knowledge, and that the solution to 
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the problem may lie within the understanding 
of a sociologist, not an economist./16/ 
 
Stiglitz points out that regulatory reform is the 
matter of the greatest importance./17/ In 
addition, it is necessary to implement a series 
of micro and macro-interventions with a view 
to the  long-term stabilization of the economy. 
He emphasizes that it is sufficient to draw on 
the intellectual framework and 
recommendations of Keynesian economics, 
with a mandatory increase in the anti-crisis 
fiscal stimulus which in the case of the crisis, 
was not enough for the realization of the 
objectives set./18/ More recently, Stiglitz has 
been trying to illuminate the cost of  
widespread inequality in the distribution of 
income, a problem which  gained new 
dimensions during the crisis. 
 
Finally, one must take into account the im-
pression that a certain level of understanding 
among theorists still exists. It can be claimed, 
almost undoubtedly, that the greatest number 
of researchers, regardless of their theoretical 
background, find the solution to the crisis in 
changes to financial regulation. Regulatory 
authorities have failed. The government inter-
vention implemented in the United States has 
been widely criticised. Pro-liberal economists 
believe that intervention will not solve the key 
problems, while Pro-Keynesians require eco-
nomic policy makers  to align anti-crisis 
measures with the Keynesian policies. There 
are still no clear indications that a new macro-
economic paradigm might be created any time 
soon. Anyway, reintroducing  conservatism 
into economic policy, after the first signs of 
recovery, is certainly a dangerous strategy. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Great Depression  of the 1930s and the 
global economic crisis at the end of the last 
decade came as a recognition of a kind of cer-
tain assumptions about the circularity of eco-
nomic theory. A crisis represents a transfor-
mation of the economic context. As such, it 
comes as the best test for the leading economic 
theory of the day. The Great Depression was 
an insurmountable obstacle to the neoliberal 
concept of laissez faire. On the other hand, the 
crisis  contributed to the development of the 
Keynesian theory that affirms a completely 
different approach to economic policy. A co-
herent and intellectually strong doctrine of 
state interventionism was created. The new 
Keynesian theory had long had a decisive 
influence on making economic policies of the 
leading capitalist countries. It had been so 
until the mid-1970s, when a sudden crisis  
accelerated the reversal in the prevailing ide-
ology of economic policy. The new liberal 
schools took over primacy and created the 
conditions for establishing an integrated glob-
al neoliberal capitalism. 
However, when the modern economic crisis 
became global, doubts about  the liberal con-
cept transformed again into a renewed need 
for state intervention. There was a sudden 
reaffirmation of the Keynesian doctrine, as 
evidenced by measures of anti-cyclical mone-
tary and fiscal policies in the world's leading 
economies. Keynesianism is back in a big way. 
The real question is: Is the return of Keynesi-
anism a temporary need or a strategic impera-
tive in any modern economy? Taking into 
account the current debate surrounding mac-
roeconomics, there is no doubt that in order to 
succeed, the new macroeconomic paradigm or 
economic model of today must guarantee a 
more subtle control of the market by the state, 
especially when it comes to the regulation of 
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